R&D partnership contract coordination of information goods supply chain in government subsidy Online publication date: Wed, 03-Mar-2010
by Rong Wang, Jian-Hua Ji, X.G. Ming
International Journal of Computer Applications in Technology (IJCAT), Vol. 37, No. 3/4, 2010
Abstract: Information goods supply chain partnership is the contract relationship of co-opetition (Brandenburger and Nalebuf, 1996) innovation in nature. The main findings are as following: in the threat of strategic substituting from industrial competitor of information goods, the government subsidy policy for information goods supply chain makes up the lack of incentives to original innovation due to innovation externalities, improves information goods supply chain partners' incentives to cooperative innovation, reduces industrial competitor's incentives to imitative innovation, and makes supply chain system profit of information goods and social welfare improvement in the incentive policy of government subsidies. The perfect sharing contract may achieve greater effective coordination than non-linear transfer payment contract, along with the strengthening of the innovation basis and the extent to which partners absorb and transform technological innovation knowledge, and the improvement of intellectual property protection environment and the degree of intellectual property protection.
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