Determinants of stock options awards: evidence from French firms
by Mohamed Imen Gallali; Mehdi Bouras
International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics (IJBGE), Vol. 7, No. 4, 2012

Abstract: The literature on managers' compensation points out several factors specific to firms and to the determinants of stock options awards. At the empirical level, most studies focused on market-oriented governance mechanisms [studies on the US context (Yermack, 1995; Tzioumis, 2008)] or network-oriented systems [studies on the Japanese context (Uchida, 2006)]. We attempt to determine the factors behind stock options awards in a country characterised by a mixed governance system (market- and network-oriented) which is France. We conducted our study on a sample of 152 firms listed on the French stock market (the SBF250 index) during the 2002-2009 period. The results supported the hypothesis that the factors behind managers' stock option compensation are firm size, growth opportunities, manager's age, dividend distribution and ownership concentration.

Online publication date: Fri, 28-Dec-2012

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