Can Kyoto Protocol Parties induce the United States to adopt a more stringent greenhouse gas emissions target? Online publication date: Mon, 13-May-2013
by Claudia Kemfert, Erik Haites, Fanny Missfeldt
Interdisciplinary Environmental Review (IER), Vol. 5, No. 2, 2003
Abstract: This chapter analyzes possible strategies of Kyoto Protocol Parties to induce the United States to adopt a more stringent greenhouse gas target in 2010. Possible strategies analyzed are trade measures, adoption of developing country commitments, and sharing the benefits of research spending. Each potential strategy has a benefit or cost to the United States. The analysis calculates the incremental emission reduction target for the United States corresponding to the benefit or cost of the strategy. The maximum effect of the threats/incentives by Kyoto Protocol Parties would be to reduce the U.S. target for 2010 a little below 2000 emissions, but still above its 1990 emissions and well above its proposed Kyoto Protocol target.
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