Does CEO ownership matter in Malaysian government-controlled firms' performance? Online publication date: Sun, 26-Jul-2015
by Irene Wei Kiong Ting; Noor Azlinna Azizan; Qian Long Kweh
J. for International Business and Entrepreneurship Development (JIBED), Vol. 8, No. 3, 2015
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between chief executive officers (CEO) ownership, governmental control and firm performance as well as the moderating effect of government-linked companies (GLCs) on the relationship between CEO ownership and firm performance in Malaysian listed companies. Using an unbalanced panel data for the period from 2003 to 2010, this study develops two ordinary least squares regression models. The main findings of the analysis indicate that CEO ownership and governmental control have significantly positive impacts on Tobin's Q. Our result also reveals that governmental control as moderating variable has strengthened the relationship between CEO ownership and performance. The results support the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which argues that agency conflict arises because of the managers' self-interest behaviour. Managers may have personal goals that compete with the owner's goal in maximising shareholders' wealth.
Existing subscribers:
Go to Inderscience Online Journals to access the Full Text of this article.
If you are not a subscriber and you just want to read the full contents of this article, buy online access here.Complimentary Subscribers, Editors or Members of the Editorial Board of the J. for International Business and Entrepreneurship Development (JIBED):
Login with your Inderscience username and password:
Want to subscribe?
A subscription gives you complete access to all articles in the current issue, as well as to all articles in the previous three years (where applicable). See our Orders page to subscribe.
If you still need assistance, please email subs@inderscience.com
Our Blog 
Follow us on Twitter 
Visit us on Facebook