Article: Reputation of external directors, auditors and earnings management Journal: International Journal of Business and Globalisation (IJBG) 2020 Vol.25 No.1 pp.73 - 94 Abstract: External directors and auditors are crucial elements in determining corporate governance. The efficiency of monitoring and controlling mechanisms depends upon the effectiveness of external directors and auditors. However, the efficiency of each external director and auditor is varies. In this research, the key question is whether the reputation of external directors and auditors reflects upon the potentiality and the perceptions of monitoring and controlling in a consistent manner or not. If the reputation of external directors and auditors reflects the potentiality of monitoring, this may mitigate earnings management. Nonetheless, if reputation represents the busyness of external directors and, auditors, the results occurring would be inconsistent with the aforementioned hypothesis. In this respect, reputation was measured by the number of companies in which each external director and auditor had been appointed. According to the results, it was disclosed that the more the reputation of an external director or auditor leads to increasing of burden on external directors and auditors. As a result, this affects efficiency in controlling and monitoring the operating processes of the management. Inderscience Publishers - linking academia, business and industry through research

Title: Reputation of external directors, auditors and earnings management

Authors: Aphichet Chaiwut; Ravi Lonkani; Chaiwuth Tangsomchai; Suchanphin Suwanaphan

Addresses: Faculty of Business Administration, Chiang Mai University, Thailand ' Faculty of Business Administration, Chiang Mai University, Thailand ' Faculty of Business Administration, Chiang Mai University, Thailand ' Faculty of Business Administration, Chiang Mai University, Thailand

Abstract: External directors and auditors are crucial elements in determining corporate governance. The efficiency of monitoring and controlling mechanisms depends upon the effectiveness of external directors and auditors. However, the efficiency of each external director and auditor is varies. In this research, the key question is whether the reputation of external directors and auditors reflects upon the potentiality and the perceptions of monitoring and controlling in a consistent manner or not. If the reputation of external directors and auditors reflects the potentiality of monitoring, this may mitigate earnings management. Nonetheless, if reputation represents the busyness of external directors and, auditors, the results occurring would be inconsistent with the aforementioned hypothesis. In this respect, reputation was measured by the number of companies in which each external director and auditor had been appointed. According to the results, it was disclosed that the more the reputation of an external director or auditor leads to increasing of burden on external directors and auditors. As a result, this affects efficiency in controlling and monitoring the operating processes of the management.

Keywords: external director; auditor; earnings management; reputational hypothesis; busyness hypothesis.

DOI: 10.1504/IJBG.2020.107834

International Journal of Business and Globalisation, 2020 Vol.25 No.1, pp.73 - 94

Received: 25 Aug 2017
Accepted: 10 Jun 2018
Published online: 23 Jun 2020 *

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Title: Reputation of external directors, auditors and earnings management

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