Title: Stackelberg secure modelling game scheme for price-power control in cognitive radio enabled agriculture system

Authors: Khyati Chopra; M. Afshar Alam

Addresses: Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Jamia Hamdard, New Delhi-110062, India ' Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Jamia Hamdard, New Delhi-110062, India

Abstract: The smart 'internet of things' (IoT)-based farming is capable of capturing the sensed information and then transmitting it to the user in a cooperative cognitive radio (CCR) network. CCR has emanated as a dynamic spectrum access technique, where the powers of secondary users (SUs) are controlled such that the quality of service of primary communication is unaffected. Due to dynamic and broadcast nature of cognitive networks, the sensor devices can be controlled and monitored from remote location, but are vulnerable to attack by an unauthorised user. In this paper, we have proposed a Stackelberg game secure model for power trading in CCR network to improve the system performance and stimulate cooperation. A leader-follower scenario is set up where; the relay or leader node is trading power to source or follower node. The utilities of both source and relay are maximised and an optimal solution is obtained using convex optimisation method.

Keywords: cognitive radio; decode-forward relay; intercept probability; Stackelberg game; Nash equilibrium; cooperative cognitive radio; CCR; quality of service; QoS; internet of things; IoT.

DOI: 10.1504/IJCEE.2022.122837

International Journal of Computational Economics and Econometrics, 2022 Vol.12 No.3, pp.321 - 338

Received: 09 Oct 2020
Accepted: 11 Jun 2021
Published online: 13 May 2022 *

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