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Title: A signalling game for research fund allocation in Thailand

Authors: Thiti Duangsong; Naraphorn Paoprasert; Suwitchaporn Witchakul; Sasarose Jaijit

Addresses: Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Kasetsart University, Bangkok, 10900, Thailand ' Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Kasetsart University, Bangkok, 10900, Thailand ' Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Kasetsart University, Bangkok, 10900, Thailand ' Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering at Kamphaeng Saen, Kasetsart University, Nakhon Pathom, 73140, Thailand

Abstract: This study proposed a signalling game for a research grant allocation situation involving two players: a funding agency and a researcher whose type was kept secret from the funding agency, where the agency decided the grant amount to fund the researcher. The results showed that a pooling equilibrium existed when the difference between a large and small fund was sufficiently large, and the expected costs of failing the large-fund project for both types were small, whereas the expected costs of failing the small-fund project for both types were large. A case study was examined based on the research impact assessment of other studies. According to the results, we were still in a pooling equilibrium. However, if some model parameters changed (such as when the estimated cost of a penalty to a bad researcher was increased), a separating equilibrium began to show.

Keywords: game theory; signalling game; research funds allocation; decision analysis; Thailand.

DOI: 10.1504/IJADS.2023.134232

International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences, 2023 Vol.16 No.6, pp.788 - 803

Received: 19 Nov 2022
Accepted: 20 May 2023
Published online: 13 Oct 2023 *