Title: Perspectives on the European economic and social model: distributional and institutional conflicts

Authors: Marius R. Busemeyer, Christian Kellermann, Alexander Petring, Andrej Stuchlik

Addresses: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Paulstr. 3, 50676 Cologne, Germany. ' International Policy Analysis Unit, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Hiroshimastr. 17, 10785 Berlin, Germany. ' Research Unit 'Democracy: Structures, Performance, Challenges', Social Science Research Center Berlin, Reichpietschufer 50, Berlin, Germany. ' Freie Universitat Berlin, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Ihnestr. 56, 14195 Berlin, Germany

Abstract: Where are the fields of consensus and divergence in the positions of social democratic parties in Europe concerning the European Economic and Social Model (EESM)? Building on the findings of a Europe-wide survey, this article analyses patterns of social and economic policy preferences along country-group specific clusters. While consensus among centre-left parties concerning the general problem perception is rather strong, there is very little common ground on the level of actual problem-solving policies. This divergence can be explained by the dominance of |national| interests over the general party-political agenda. These national interests are shaped, on the one hand, by interstate distributional conflicts, and, on the other hand, by the degree of approximation of one|s own welfare state model to the model of the |core European states| – the implicit blueprint of the EESM.

Keywords: European Economic and Social Model; EESM; social democratic parties; welfare state regimes; varieties of capitalism; distributional conflicts; institutional conflicts; social policy preferences; economic policy preferences; national interests; public policy.

DOI: 10.1504/IJPP.2008.017125

International Journal of Public Policy, 2008 Vol.3 No.1/2, pp.39 - 57

Published online: 15 Feb 2008 *

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