Forthcoming Articles

International Journal of Corporate Governance

International Journal of Corporate Governance (IJCG)

Forthcoming articles have been peer-reviewed and accepted for publication but are pending final changes, are not yet published and may not appear here in their final order of publication until they are assigned to issues. Therefore, the content conforms to our standards but the presentation (e.g. typesetting and proof-reading) is not necessarily up to the Inderscience standard. Additionally, titles, authors, abstracts and keywords may change before publication. Articles will not be published until the final proofs are validated by their authors.

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International Journal of Corporate Governance (One paper in press)

Regular Issues

  • Corporate governance index, agency issues, cash flow, and investment inefficiency: an international evidence   Order a copy of this article
    by Jawahar Kumar, Jitendra Mahakud 
    Abstract: This study investigates the impact of corporate governance on investment inefficiency, overinvestment, and underinvestment across 3,589 firms listed in 22 countries from 2014 to 2022. Drawing on agency theory, it examines how internal governance mechanisms influence investment efficiency using a fixed-effects regression model. Sub-sample analyses are conducted for developed and emerging countries, large and small firms, and countries with high and low governance quality, while system GMM estimation confirms the robustness of the findings. The results reveal that stronger corporate governance significantly reduces overall investment inefficiency and overinvestment, whereas its effect on underinvestment is statistically insignificant. Consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis, higher free cash flow exacerbates investment inefficiency. Corporate governance proves more effective in developed countries, large firms, and strong country-level governance environments, where institutional complementarities amplify its disciplinary role. The study underscores the importance of governance quality in optimising investment decisions and mitigating agency conflicts.
    Keywords: corporate governance; cash flow; investment inefficiency; agency problems.
    DOI: 10.1504/IJCG.2026.10081150
     

 

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