Corporate board monitoring, political connection and real earnings management practice in Nigeria Online publication date: Wed, 16-Jun-2021
by Armaya'u Alhaji Sani; Rohaida Abdul Latif; Redhwan Al-Dhamari
Afro-Asian J. of Finance and Accounting (AAJFA), Vol. 11, No. 3, 2021
Abstract: This study examines the influence of corporate board monitoring on real earnings management practice in Nigeria. It also explores whether the presence of politically connected directors weakens/strengthen the board by using 385 firm-year observations of listed companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period between 2012 and 2016. The study uses Driscoll-Kraay standard error regression to estimate the model parameters. The results show that politically connected directors have significant positive influence on real earnings manipulations. We also establish that the interaction of politically connected directors with the board weakened the board monitoring power, and thus led to breach of corporate governance. The results also indicate that foreign CEOs and CEOs with financial expertise decrease the propensity of real earnings manipulations in Nigeria. Hence, we draw the attention of regulators to improve the independence of the board in order to control politically connected directors from weakening the board monitoring power.
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