Auditor-auditee negotiation: effects of auditor independence and expertise in Tunisian context
by Manel Hadriche Sahnoun, Mohamed Ali Zarai
International Journal of Critical Accounting (IJCA), Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of auditor independence (auditor tenure) and expertise (auditor industry specialist, auditor experience and the audit firm size) on auditor-auditee negotiation outcomes. For the entire sample of 53 Tunisians firms for the period 2001-2007, our results indicate non-significant relationship between auditor tenure and auditor-auditee negotiation outcomes, a positive and significant relationship between auditor experience and the extent to which the auditee agreed with the auditor over the financial reporting issues. On the other hand, the results indicate a positive but non-significant relationship between the auditor industry specialist and the negotiation outcome. For the audit firm size, we find a negative and significant effect on negotiation outcome. Indeed, we find no significant relationship between auditee importance and size and auditor-auditee negotiation outcome.

Online publication date: Tue, 21-Oct-2014

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