Impersonation attack on CertificateLess key agreement protocol Online publication date: Wed, 31-Jan-2018
by Suman Bala; Gaurav Sharma; Anil K. Verma
International Journal of Ad Hoc and Ubiquitous Computing (IJAHUC), Vol. 27, No. 2, 2018
Abstract: Key agreement is a fundamental activity to establish communication between two parties. Kim et al. (2013) proposed a CertificateLess two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocol, which is secure in extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. This paper describes the security flaw of Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, which is found vulnerable against Key-Compromise Impersonation (K-CI) attack. For the resistance of the attack in Kim et al.'s CTAKA protocol, a defensive measure has been proposed, which is secure in eCK model.
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